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This paper investigates the impact of monetary policy on firms’ liability structure depending on 
their specific characteristics (size, age, profit, and collateral) over the period 2010 to 2016 using 
firm-level data. Our results provide evidence that firms borrowing tend to decrease after a 
restrictive monetary policy, in line with the traditional interest rate channel. We confirm that 
small and medium firms are more significantly affected by tight monetary policy conditions than 
large firms, suggesting the existence of the balance sheet channel in Morocco. 
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1. Introduction  
To assess the effectiveness of monetary policy, researchers attribute a prominent role to 
understanding the process through which central banks’ policy actions transmit to the financial 
and real sectors. Among various channels of monetary transmission, the interest rate pass-
through has been studied extensively. In the last decade, intensity of a debate about the role, 
design, and efficacy of monetary policy significantly increased. An important aspect of this 
debate, which animated both policymakers and academics, was the spreading awareness of the 
importance of balance sheet developments in banking and corporate sectors. It seems that there 
is an emerging consensus that strength and speed of the monetary policy transmission is related 
to banking and non-financial sectors characteristics. However, the literature on the monetary 
transmission mechanism for lower middle-income countries is relatively scarce and the balance 
sheet channel has been, at least for several years, surprisingly underexplored. Indeed, the 
availability of granular data from bank and borrower-level is certainly a key element to explore 
the pass-through mechanism at the level of financial and non-financial firms. 
This paper is intended to contribute to this debate by using a unique data set for the Moroccan 
firms. The main objective is to examine the impact of monetary policy on firms’ liability structure 
and investigate whether some determinants such as size, age, profit, and collateral affect their 
financial decisions. Accordingly, the objective of the present paper is to contribute to the growing 
literature on the relationship between monetary policy and corporate lending in developing 
countries. Our analysis will be conducted using big data containing a large panel of Moroccan 
firms over the last decade. Overall, we would like to answer the following questions: (i) is there 
any evidence of the effectiveness of the balance sheet channel in Morocco? (ii) regarding 
monetary policy decisions, do firm-specific factors (size, age, profit, and collateral) influence the 
monetary transmission mechanism? (iii) in particular, is SME access to bank financing sensitive to 
the stance of monetary policy actions? 
To answer these questions, we analyze the sensitivity of liability structure of 220 000 firm-year 
observations to changes in the monetary policy instrument, measured by the interbank interest 
rate, during the period 2010-2016. We study determinants of equity capital to total assets, 
financial debt to total assets, trade credit to total assets (which may be a substitution for financial 
debt) and associated debtto total assets. To the best of our knowledge, we provide the first 
examination of the balance sheet channel based on individual firm-level data in developing 
countries. A characteristic feature of our analysis is to account for firm-specific behavior using 
CIFEN5. With respect to the modeling framework, we employ the panel data techniques to 
examine the link between the corporate finance and monetary policy. Our research is closely 
linked to the existing literature considering the relationship between monetary policy shocks and 
corporate finance from micro-level perspective6. This approach yields valuable information for 
policymakers as it allows to disentangle between the interest rate channel and the balance sheet 
																																								 																				
5 CIFEN database contains firms’ financial information as reported in the Trade Register. This database constitutes 
an exhaustive reporting on the financial situation of all the formal sectors of the Moroccan economy, including 
manufacturing, construction, retail trade firms and services. 
6 See Bougheas et al. (2006) ; Fidrmuc et al. (2010) ; De Haan and Sterken (2006) ; Prasad and Ghosh (2005) and 
Acharya and Naqvi (2012).	
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channel and provides evidence on how the liability structure of firms is affected by monetary 
policy impulses. 
In terms of results, our findings are in line with the bulk of evidence in the literature. This study 
highlights a high degree of heterogeneity in firms’ reaction depending on their liability structure. 
Size is found to be an important determinant of financial debt for both SME and big firms. With 
more real assets, firms tend to have greater access to financial debt and trade credit. Also, our 
findings support the evidence that collateral is an important factor in banks’ pricing policy of 
loans granted to VSE as it constitutes a credit risk compensation allowing banks to reduce their 
exposition to systemic risks. In addition, following the accommodative monetary policy adopted 
by the Bank Al-Maghrib during the last decade, our estimation results suggest that SME access to 
banking finance has improved compared to big firms. It is noteworthy that several measures have 
been recently undertaken in Morocco by the government, the central bank, private banks and 
international institutions in order to enhance the access of SME to finance: relaxation of creation 
procedures, reinforcing the role of the Central Guarantee Office to support SME financing at 
every stage of their life cycle, creation of different schemes to support SME in their process of 
modernization and improvement of their competitiveness, an incentive taxation scheme, the 
creation of the Financial Funds Support, unconventional monetary instruments. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of the relevant 
literature related to the credit view theory. In section 3, we present our empirical framework. 
Section 4 describes briefly the data and presents some relevant stylized facts underlying the 
moroccan economic structure. Section 5 reports our results. Concluding remarks and policy 
lessons are in Section 6. 
2. Literature review 
According to the Modigliani and Miller (1958) theorem, the value of a firm in a perfect world 
does not depend on the structure of financing (self-financing or external financing). Several 
macroeconomic models have been inspired by this theory and incorporate the perfect market 
assumption which limits any impact of the financing constraints on the real cycle. However, 
Gertler and Bernanke (1989) have shown that the presence of asymmetric information in the 
credit market is of particular interest, given that the borrower’s balance sheet and 
creditworthiness are decisive for the investment behavior and can explain macroeconomic 
fluctuations. In this context, Bernanke et al. (1999) have developed a model that takes into 
account asymmetries and imperfections in the credit market in order to better understand the 
transmission of nominal and real shocks of small magnitude to the economy. Following this 
framework, the spread mechanism, also called the financial accelerator, refers to the link between 
borrowing costs and the net wealth of firms. Entrepreneurs who are borrowing to finance their 
investment projects face an external financing premium, defined as the difference between the 
cost of financing by issuing equity in the capital market and the opportunity cost of mobilizing 
internal funding. The financing premium is inversely correlated with the net wealth of the firms 
and increases as the firms’ leverage ratios rise. 
In the presence of financial frictions, the literature review identifies several channels that 
contribute to the amplification of interactions between the real and financial spheres, particularly: 
the financial accelerator channel and the collateral channel. The financial accelerator can be 
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defined as a catalyst which helps to spread an initial shock to the business and financial cycles. 
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) introduced the real estate in the DSGE models as a factor of 
production and a collateral used in the credit market. The collateral channel, also called the inter-
temporal multiplier, stipulates that an increase in asset prices improves the households and firms’ 
wealth, encouraging them to consume and invest more, which contribute to easing the financial 
condition index. In this case, the dynamic interaction between the financing access conditions 
and asset prices is considered as a powerful transmission mechanism through which the effects of 
economic shocks persist, amplify and spread to other sectors. 
Viewed from the credit view theory perspective, financial frictions play a key role in amplifying 
the effects of monetary policy actions. The literature on the lending and the balance sheet 
channels is extensive7. The bank lending channel implies that the effects of monetary policy 
actions are related to banks financial structure, which emphasises the relevance of banks’ financial 
structure in the transmission mechanism. In contrast, the balance sheet channel is related to the 
impact of monetary policy on the demand for loans. For instance, monetary policy tightening 
makes the financing conditions very strict, which imposes very high external financing premium 
on borrowers to enable banks to hedge against the default risk. In addition, investment and the 
return on capital decline and therefore reduce the net wealth of firms and increase their debt-to-
equity ratio. This reduces the demand for capital, which reinforces the decline in its value. 
The empirical literature that examines the role of the financial channels reflecting imperfections 
in credit markets and balance sheet dynamics in the transmission of monetary policy has been 
largely explored. While there is a voluminous literature assessing the transmission mechanism via 
the balance sheet channel using aggregated data8, recent studies provide comprehensive and 
granulated information for policy makers by intensively analyzing micro level data. Bougheas et 
al. (2006), have examined firms’ access to bank and market finance when allowance is made for 
differences in firm-specific characteristics. Their model is estimated on a large panel of UK 
manufacturing firms, and their results show that smaller, more risky and younger firms are more 
affected by monetary tightening. De Haan and Sterken (2006) analyzed the sensitivity of 
corporate debt structures to changes in the monetary policy and found evidence of the broad 
channel. Prasad and Ghosh (2005) studied corporate behavior for a sample of manufacturing 
firms in India. Their findings suggest that a contractionary monetary policy lowers overall debt 
including bank debt, and increase their short-term bank borrowings. 
Fidrmuc et al. (2010) analyzed the determinants of corporate interest rates and the financial 
accelerator using a panel of Czech firms, and found that selected balance sheet indicators 
significantly influence the firm’ interest rates. They also find that debt structure and cash flow 
have significanteffects on interest rates, whereas collateral plays no significant role, and monetary 
policy has stronger effects on smaller firms than on medium-size and larger firms. Buera et al. 
(2018) used the Bank of Portugal’s rich credit registry database together with bank and firm 
balance sheet information to show that highly leveraged firms and firms that had a larger share of 
short-term debt on their balance sheet contracted more credit in the aftermath of a financial 
shock. Jiménez et al. (2012) analyzed a Spanish microdataset with information on old and new 
																																								 																				
7 Bernanke and Gertler (1989, 1995 and 2005) ; Mishkin (1996) ; Gertler and Gilchrist (1993 and 1994) ; Kashyap 
and Stein (1995) ; Oliner and Rudebusch (1996). 
8
	See the survey in Guiso et al. (1999).		
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loan applications. They find that lower GDP growth or positive short-term interest rate changes 
reduce loan granting. They also find that a decrease in firm capital reduces loan granting. 
3. Empirical framework 
In this section, we describe our identification and empirical strategy. In particular, we present the 
relationship between the liability structure of firms and their specific characteristics in our micro-
data using a panel regression model that enables us to control for firm specific unobservable 
effects. Following De Haan and Sterken (2006), and Bougheas et al. (2006), the model is as 
follows:  




𝑇𝑀𝑃! ∗ 𝑋!,! + 𝛾!∆𝐺𝐷𝑃!!! + 𝛼! + 𝜂!,! 
where, 𝑌!,! denotes one of the following four liability choices of firms : (i) equity capital to total 
assets, (ii) financial debt to total assets, (iii) trade credit to total assets and (iv) associated debts to 
total assets. 𝑇𝑀𝑃!  is introduced to capture the monetary policy stance. 𝑋!,! denotes firm-specific 
characteristics, we introduce “size” measured by logarithm of total assets; the “age” measured by 
the number of years in existence to quantify the firm’s reputation build-up and relationship with 
financial institution; the ratio of tangible assets to total assets to measure “collateral” available to 
support borrowing; the “profit” measured by the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to 
total assets, which is a proxy of profitability scaled by capital. Finally, to ensure that we can 
control for the effects of the business cycle, we use  ∆𝐺𝐷𝑃!!!, which is the one-year-lagged real 
GDP growth rate. We are interested in the significance of interactions of firm-specific variables 
with the monetary policy measure. If the interaction term 𝛾! is significant and the assumption 
that interest rate supply elasticity is equal across banks maintained, the conclusion is that the 
given variable systematically influences demand reaction of firms after a monetary policy action. 
All of our balance-sheet variables (except for “size”) where normalized by firm’s total assets. As 
dependent variables, we use the liabilities items with different economic meaning. First, equity 
determines firm leverage and distribution of risk between shareholders and creditors. Higher 
equity (lower leverage) improves the risk profile of creditors since equity is first in line to absorb 
any losses. Therefore, a firm with low credit quality or with poor access to external finance (e.g. 
due to small size or lack of collateral) would be forced to rely mostly on owner-provided funding. 
For non-equity external finance, we look at financial debt and trade credit. The financial debt 
category includes bank loans, bonds issued and other financial liabilities, so it reflects mostly the 
ability and willingness of the firm to obtaining funds from financial intermediaries (in particular 
banks). On the other hand, trade credit arises from transactions with non-financial firms and 
reflects both creditworthiness of the firm and its negotiation power with respect to other 
cooperating firms. To some extent, these funding sources might be treated by a firm as 
substitutes. Last, we also look at the role of associated debts that, as instruments provided by 
owners, might be to some extent interpreted as being substitutes to equity. 
On the asset side, we look at a firm’s ability to provide collateral, as this is an important factor 
decreasing information asymmetries between a lender and a borrower and decreasing risk faced 
by a creditor. As a proxy for available collateral, we use the sum of tangible fixed assets and 
financial fixed assets (and normalize it by firm’s total assets). Another variable that is used to 
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control for creditworthiness and possible information asymmetry is a firm’s age. We assume that 
the firm that is active in the market for a long-enough period is better known to banks and non-
financial cooperating firms and therefore should have easier access to external finance (as big 
firms tend to be better known in the market and might be therefore more transparent than small 
firms and enjoy additional market power against their competitors, increasing probability of 
liabilities being repaid). Last, we use “profit” as a proxy for firm efficiency and creditworthiness. 
This variable is measured as the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total assets, scaled 
by capital. We assume that firms with higher profits might be more efficient and be assessed by 
potential creditors as characterized by lower risk. 
Our model proposes to test whether the liability compositions of Moroccans firms, as reflected in 
their balance sheet items, are determined by firm-specific characteristics, monetary policy, and the 
business cycle. Based on the idea of firms’ heterogeneity, the choice of a liability structure for 
different categories: large enterprises (LE), small and medium enterprises (SME) and very small 
enterprises (VSE) is likely to vary in important ways with the changes in business conditions and 
the fluctuations in the macroeconomic environment caused by monetary policy shocks. For these 
reasons, we investigate which type of firms are most sensitive to monetary policy shocks, and 
how the liability structure predicts heterogeneity in the response of firm specific characteristics.  
Generally speaking, there are two main approaches to investigating the differential response of 
firms to monetary policy. The first one consists in estimating the model for two or more groups 
of firms depending on the features of interest (age, size, leverage, solvability, liquidity, profit). 
The second approach aims at including firm-specific characteristics in the regressions as an 
interaction term with the monetary policy measure. Our methodology consists of estimating the 
interest rate pass-through coefficients using two approaches and thus serves as a natural 
robustness check in our analysis. We estimate our model for all firms and also for the different 
categories (LE, SME, VSE). The firms are classified according to the Central Bank’s 
classification. Firms having a turnover higher than MAD 170 milion are reported as large firms 
(LE), whereas those between MAD 10 milion and MAD 170 milion are considered to be small 
and medium firms (SME). Finally, the remaining firms below MAD 10 milion are considered to 
be very small firms (VSE). 
To analyze the above-mentioned relationships, we employ the linear panel model. We test for a 
fixed versus a random effects structure of the model using the Hausman specification test in 
order to determine the precise structure of the model. The Hausman test rejected the hypothesis 
of systematic difference between coefficients obtained from the two models. Therefore, we 
report the fixed effects estimates.  
We do not control for specific loan-supply effects, neither for the borrowing cost and the spread 
applied by commercial banks on top of the lending rates. Our specification does not take into 
account changes of prudential and debt regulation and taxation/subvention system. Although 
this is a limitation of our data-set, we believe that further research should shed light on these 
aspects. Therefore, given the possible endogeneity problem indicated in the literature, which can 
be also related to the measurement error associated with the profit reported by firms, we 
considered using the panel GMM estimator suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991), however, the 
Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions indicated that all the proposed instruments are invalid.  
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Also, the requirement for instruments under GMM poses a problem for our study. The period 
when monetary policy was loose occurs only at the very beginning of our sample. If we were to 
make use of GMM those observations at the beginning of our sample would be lost, and the 
results would be indicative only of firms’ debt under a benign period of monetary policy. This 
would severely undermine the rationale for our empirical work, and therefore we rely on fixed 
effects estimates.  
4. Data 
4.1. Database description 
Our database comes from the confidential microdata underlying the Moroccan firms’ financial 
information as registered in the Trade Registry (CIFEN), a survey that collects information on 
the financial situation of all the formal sectors of the Moroccan economy, including 
manufacturing, construction, retail trade firms and services. CIFEN contains more than 400 000 
firms. All the firms arerequired to report either a simplified or detailed version of their balance 
sheet statement each year. The database covers both balance sheet and profit and loss statement 
items. Our paper is the first research paper to make extensive use of this data-set, allowing us to 
draw novel conclusions about the Moroccan economy and the monetary transmission process. 
We decided to adopt an unbalanced panel for the sake of completeness. In addition, the new 
comers give valuable information for our analysis. Also, we decided to keep firms who stopped 
to report their balance sheets and their income statements because some firms bankrupted and 
some merged. Therefore, the behavior of vulnerable firms could impact indirectly the existing 
firms’ financial structure.   
Since the reporting system does not ensure full automatic data validation at the submission stage, 
we made extensive attempts to clean the data9. Our primary goal in this was to eliminate 
inconsistencies and obvious errors from the estimation sample. First, we ensured that the sample 
included only observations where total assets equalled total liabilities. Further, we checked 
whether sub-components of different categories added up properly to higher-level values. Next, 
we eliminated observations with negative values for non-negative variables (most of balance-
sheet items). Finally, we tried to identify observations with erroneously entered values that were 
not identified in previous steps by looking at excessive volatility of observations over time for a 
given firm. This procedure left us with almost 220 000 firm-year observations. 
4.2. Summary statistics 
Our panel consists of a relatively large number of VSE, denoting that the non-financial corporate 
sector in Morocco is dominated by this firm category. The VSE represented 74% of total firms in 
2016, while SME and LE were accounting for respectively 23% and 2%. Figures 1,2,3 and 4 give 
the liability composition across firms for different time periods and for different size categories 
(all firms, LE, SME, VSE) at the aggregate level. We observe that there was little variation in the 
structure of liabilities during 2010-2016. The aggregate data confirms that the share of equity 
capital and financial debt are larger than that of the other liability components for all firms. In 
																																								 																				
9 The raw data also contained bankrupted, dissolved, in liquidation, and inactive firms, which may not react to 
monetary policy changes properly.	
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addition, SME and VSE tend to have more associated debts than large firms, while large firms 
have a higher share of financial debt in their current liabilities than SME and VSE.  
Figures 5 to 8 provide evidence of heterogeneity in terms of size, collateral, profit and age. The 
financial debt of LE during the period 2010-2016 represented approximately 62% of the total 
financial debt. In terms of collateral, large firms have relatively comfortable buffers, compared to 
SME and VSE. In fact, the share of collateral held by LE represents 57% of the total available 
collateral. In terms of profitability, LE account for 70% of the profit generated by all firms. 
Finally, the average age of LE is 25, which is about three times the average age of VSE (9 years 
old). 
The look at structural characteristics confirms observations on the agregated level that the size of 
the firm might matter for their financing structure (see Figures 9-18). Although leverage 
(measured as the equity/total assets ratio) is not very different between the size groups, the 
sources of external finance differ a lot. Very small firms are in practice cut off from the access to 
financial debt and rely to a significantly lower extent that larger firms on trade credit. They close 
this gap by relying on associated debts. On the other hand, large firms have the easiest access to 
financial debt and use also quite a lot of financing by trade credit. 
Before we estimate the model, it is informative to explore the covariation of our core variables a 
bit further (Tables 1, 2, 7 and 8). First, correlations between equity, financial debts, credit trade, 
associated debts are all negative by definition. Second, trade credit appears to be negatively 
correlated with financial, which suggests that financial and trade debt might be substitutes 
(Mateut et al., 2006). Age and size are positively correlated, indicating that the older a firm 
becomes, the more assets it tends to accumulate. Collateral is positively correlated with financial 
debt and equity, and negatively correlated with credit trade. 






Table 2: Correlation matrix for SME firms 
 
5. Results 
In this section, we analyze the response of firm’s liability structure to monetary policy depending 
on their specific characteristics. We report the results for SME (Table 3), big firms (Table 4), 
VSE (Table 5) and all firms (Table 6) corresponding to each measure of the financing choice: 
equity capital to total assets; financial debt to total assets; trade credit to total assets; and 
associated debts to total assets. We discuss the impact of monetary policy tightening while 
controlling for firm-specificities, business cycles, and interaction terms between interest rates and 
firm-specific indicators (age, size, profit and collateral). The latter will allow us to test for the 
heterogeneity assumption and the possible existence of the balance sheet channel. For the sake of 
completeness, we provide the estimation results for the analyzed liability categories. As previously 
mentioned, not all of these variables have similar importance for all the firm size categories10. 
Thus, we estimate our model for all firms and for different categories (LE, SME, VSE). 
With respect to the control variables, firms’ size and age are found to play a prominent role in 
determining the leverage and debt ratios, in particular for the case of SME and VSE. Within all 
size groupings, larger firms tend to be more leveraged (as the estimate of the parameter for the 
equity capital ratio is consistently negative) than younger firms. For SME and very small firms the 
higher leverage is financed by all other possible liability categories (i.e. financial debt, trade credit 
and associated debts). For large firms, however, the parameter for size in the trade credit 
regression is not significant, suggesting that as a large firm grows, the higher leverage is financed 
mostly by financial debt. Surprisingly, older SME and VSE tend to have less external debt and 
more internal funding. We find estimates of the effect of age slightly non-intuitive, as it seems 
that consistently across size groupings older firms tend to be characterized by lower leverage 
(higher equity capital ratio). Intuitively, the age variable is quite often assumed to be a proxy for 
lower opacity of the firm and, therefore, a signal that the firm can have easier and cheaper access 
																																								 																				
10 For example, the financial debt is hardly an important category for very small firms, whereas the associated debt 
plays only very marginal role for large firms. 
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to external finance as they have a higher reputation and stronger relationships with the banking 
sector compared to younger firms. Our results suggest another plausible story –older firms have 
had more time to accumulate profits and owners have preferred to retain profits within these 
firms rather than to receive dividends. This accumulation of profits decreased the firm’s demand 
for external funding and results in lower leverage. This interpretation for big and SME firms is 
supported by a positive and significant relationship between profit and equity as profits are 
related to more equity finance and less financial debt. 
Profit has a negative impact on financial debt and associated debt both for small and large firms, 
suggesting that LE and SME with higher earning tend to issue less debt in the financial market. 
Indeed, more profitable firms may rather rely on their own capital, which tends to be less 
expensive than external financing as compared to less profitable firms. Nevertheless, point 
estimates suggest that the use of financial debt is determined by the firms’ profit for the case of 
VSE. 
Concerning the collateral, very small firms are typically assumed to suffer most from information 
asymmetry problems and to alleviate these problems they need to hold more collateral. This 
effect is clearly supported in our results for very small firms - in this group firms with more 
collateral can afford higher leverage (less equity) and more external finance in the form of both 
financial debt and trade credit. Our findings support the evidence that collateral is an important 
factor in banks’ pricing policy of loans granted to VSE as it constitutes a credit risk compensation 
allowing banks to reduce their exposition to systemic risks. On the other hand, it is not clear why 
such a relationship is not visible in the estimation results for SME and large firms, except for a 
marginally significant effect on trade credit for SME. These findings suggest that SME with 
higher collateral tend to substitute financial debt by trade credit, however, LE can easily access 
the financial market independently from holding better guarantees. 
We control for the stance of monetary policy and the business cycle in order to determine the 
interest rate pass-through coefficients and differentiate the transmission mechanism along the 
boom-bust cycle. Several features are noteworthy. First, we notice that the responses of equity 
and debt ratios are statistically significant and in line with the traditional interest rate channel of 
monetary policy transmission for SME and VSE. Second, following a monetary policy 
contraction, SME and VSE tend to substitute financial lending by trade credit and associated 
debt. Third, it seems that large firms’ borrowing decision is affected by the market interest rates 
to a lesser extent. 
Regarding the business cycle position, estimation results suggest that SME’s indebtedness is 
procyclical. In fact, debt ratios are positively correlated with GDP growth rates, meaning that 
borrowing decisions are drived by better economic perspective and higher profitability of 
investment perceived by banks and firms. By contrast, debt ratios of VSE and LE appear to be 
unaffected by the business cycle, suggesting that their indebtedness seems to be rather acyclical. 
To assess the heterogeneity determinants stemming from firms’ financial structure, we focus on 
the interaction terms between firm-specific characteristics and the policy rate. According to the 
results, for the case of SME and VSE, the reaction of firms to changes in interest rates is 
different depending on the size, as large firms are affected less in terms of financial debt. 
Furthermore, collateral appears as a potential factor of heterogeneity for LE, SME and VSE. 
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During a restrictive monetary policy, more collateralized LE, SME and VSE reduce their financial 
debt less and their trade credit more than less collateralized firms. Highly collateralized firms, 
which have better access to financial market, may be more flexible in shifting from financial debt 
to trade credit. Concerning big firms, we observe that during a monetary tightening, more 
profitable LE reduce their equity more and their financial debt less than less profitable firms. 
These results suggest that when the interest rate tightens, LE with more profit have better access 
to financial sector. Moreover, the age and size do not seem to entail heterogeneity among LE 
because these factors do not affect the transmission mechanism. 
Our estimation results confirm that firms’ funding structures and potential reactions to monetary 
policy shocks depend, to a large extent, on firms’ size. We confirm that large firms are relatively 
less restricted in their financing decisions and their individual characteristics matter less in 
determining large firms’ reactions to monetary policy. On the other hand, SME and very small 
firms face issues related to their opacity and asymmetric information, resulting in more extensive 
(compared to big firms) determination of their funding structure by other firm-specific variables, 
as is demonstrated by statistical significance of interactions of these variables with the monetary 
policy measure. 
In sum, we find heterogeneity in terms of liability composition and thus the sources of external 
finance. Yet substantial differences exist across firms. The results provide evidence that SME and 
VSE are more dependent on associated debts than large firms. In addition, the reliance on 
financial debt and trade credit is more pronounced for LE, while only to a lesser extent for SME 
and VSE. Our results confirm that firm-specific characteristics are important in determining the 
variation in the liability structure as monetary policy becomes tighter. Overall, it seems that 
negotiation power or the competition from the borrower side matters, suggesting the existence of 
the balance sheet channel. The effect of the tightening of monetary policy is more important for 
SME than large firms. Thus, following the accommodative monetary policy adopted by Bank Al-
Maghrib during the last decade, our estimation results suggest that SME access to banking 













Table 3: Results for SME firms 
 





Table 5: Results for VSE firms 
 





6. Conclusion  
This paper contributes to the existing literature by studying for the first time so extensively the 
unique micro data-set on Moroccan corporate sector from funding and monetary policy 
perspectives. We document both the balance sheet structure of Moroccan non-financial firms 
and its relevance for monetary policy. 
Our preliminary data analysis and estimation results confirm that firms’ funding structures and 
potential reactions to monetary policy shocks depend, to a large extent, on firms’ size. We 
confirm that large firms are relatively less restricted in their financing decisions and their 
individual characteristics matter less in determining large firms’ reactions to monetary policy. On 
the other hand, SME and very small firms face issues related to their opacity and asymmetric 
information, resulting in more extensive (compared to big firms) determination of their funding 
structure by other firm-specific variables, as is demonstrated by statistical significance of 
interactions of this variables with the monetary policy measure. 
Differences in funding structure between firms belonging to different size groups point also to 
the fact that bigger firms might be able to force their smaller business partners to provide finance 
in the form of trade credit. Given potential problems of smaller firms to secure bank funding 
(and possibly higher cost of this funding), it might be the factor inhibiting smaller firms’ growth 
prospects and investment volumes. This issue needs to be monitored in order to assess whether 
the extent of this development warrants introduction of public policies to improve long-term 
growth prospects of the whole economy. 
Additional supportive economic policies aimed at improving the approach to entrepreneurship, 
simplifying the regulatory and policy environment for SME, and removing the remaining barriers 
to their development could benefit Morocco, improve the allocation of resources to more 
productive investment and enhance the effectiveness of macroeconomic policies (improve 
competition in the banking sector, develop alternative financing mechanisms, in particular 
business angels and venture capital, enhance the SME governance, strengthen the financial 
integration, develop credit register). We consider the results obtained so far as an important 
factor supporting further research in this area. Research using micro-level data related to 
emerging economies is relatively scarce, so results are clearly of academic interest. However, there 
is also an important dimension of supporting decision making for public policies in general and 
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Figure 1: Average Structure of finance for all firms 
 
Figure 2: Average Structure of finance for big firms 
 





Figure 4: Average Structure of finance for very small firms 
 
Figure 5: Financial debt issued by firms between 2010-2016 
 
















Figure 7: Pofit generated by firms between 2010-2016 
 
Figure 8: Average age of firms between 2010-2016 
 














Figure 10: Distribution over time of financial debts/assets ratio, by size groups 
 




Figure 12: Distribution over time of associated debts/assets ratio, by size groups 
 
















Figure 16: Kernel density of trade credit/assets ratio for the whole sample, by size groups 
 
 







Figure 18: Kernel density of collateral/assets ratio for the whole sample, by size groups 
 





Table 8: Correlation matrix for all firms 
 
